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Nightmares are prominent, along with terrifying hypnagogic and hypnopompic hallucinations. Qo@ inquiry discloses that the depression is more liable than is usual with major affective illnesses and that there may be severalmood swings each day. Amnesia or â€˜¿ time loss' may affect as many as 90%, and fugue episodes and feelings of depersonalisation occur in more than 50Â°lo. There is sleepwalking in many subjects, anxiety, phobic symptoms, substance abuse, and hallucinations during the day as well. Self-mutilation occurs in about a third of patients.
The life history is almost always marked by sexual abuse. A great majority of patients are women.
Some patients declare their diagnosis. Otherwise says Putnam, (1989, p. 90) , the therapist who wishes to â€oe¿ elicit alter personalitiesâ€• should ask gentle questions about whether the patient has ever felt like more than one person, searching for another part, and ultimately asking â€oe¿ Do you ever feel as if you are not alone, as if there is someone else or some other part watching you?â€• In the event of a response the therapist looks for â€oe¿ any.. . attribute, function or description to use as a label to elicit this other part directlyâ€•.This is a very clear and honest statement, but with such an approach there is a likelihood that the therapist will produce the phenomenon.
The more dramatic examples of this syndrome attract much attention, ranging from The Three Faces of Eve (Thigpen & Cleckley, 1957) to an unfortunate 27-year-old waitress in Oshkosh, Wisconsin, who claimed to have 46 different personalities, of whom 328 MERSKEY viewed with scepticism by others and is rarely, if ever, found in Japan (Takahashi, 1990) or Britain. Occasionally clinicians (Allison & Schwarz, 1980; Kiuft, 1982 ) mention patients with 20 or more personalities. DSM-III-R states that 100 personalities can occur in one person. Fahy (1988) argued that the literature lacks information on the reliability of diagnosis, prevalence, or the role of selection bias, that iatrogenic factors may contribute to MPD, and that there is little evidence from genetic or physiological studies to suggest that it represents a distinct psychiatric disorder. Hacking (1986) suggests that the idea of multiple personalities â€oe¿ was largely invented by doctors, but later became a spontaneous way in which to express unhappinessâ€•. Aidridge Morris (1989) calls it an exercise in deception and sees it as a cultural phenomenon.
Some clinicians working on dissociative memory disorders encounter inordinate numbers of cases of MPD. Others report none. Ljungberg (1957) found none among 381 patients with overt hysterical symptoms. In 89 cases of classic dissociative or conversion disorder (Merskey & Buhrich, 1975 ) I encountered no MPD. In 36 years I found none among many more patients with conversion disorders. One patient dissociated and talked to herself in a detached fashion. In that instance the genesis of MPD was carefully avoided. Another, under the care of a colleague, declaredshe had reportedher multiple personalities to please the doctors who first told her that that was her condition. Mayer-Grosset al (1954, 1977) said that multiple personalities were always artificial productions, due to medical attention and literary interest. Sim (1981) likewise gives a sceptical report. Chodoff (1987) noted the rarity of cases in his own practice and that of colleagues. Fahy et a! (1989) reported a patient who fulfilled the diagnostic criteria for MPD. She had seen the film The Three Faces of Eve and read the book Sybil (Schreiber, 1973) . Directing her attention away from the â€˜¿ alternate personalities' led to their decline.
With each favourable step in the public discussion, more cases have occurred. The problem is whether MPD represents a valid syndrome. Simpson (1989) remarks critically upon the enthusiasm of its protagonists. Aldridge-Morris (1989) suggests that itisunhelpful toregard itasa discrete clinical entity and that it is being grossly overdiagnosed.
The disproportionate numbers of female patients (e.g. 90% in the report of Ross et a! (1990) ) raise a question as to whether this is a natural phenomenon related to sex or a social product due to earlier ill-treatment or other forces. It may result from abuse of individuals or from encouragement to comply with a special role, or from both such causes.
The increasingnumbers of cases
Scepticism about the diagnosis has been increased by this great growth in numbers of cases. The pattern of this growth is noteworthy. The first supposed case of MPD recorded in detail is that of Mary Reynolds of Pennsylvania (Mitchill, 1816; Plumer, 1860; Mitchell, 1888) . The initial report by Mitchill (1816) is third-hand and brief. Plumer (1860) described the history six years after the patient's death, from interviews with her relatives. Weir Mitchell described the case again in 1888from Plumer's report and from the papers of his father, J. K. Mitchell. He also re-interviewed the same relatives as Plumer had consulted. About thattime therewas lengthy discussion of several cases, especially by Azam (1876 Azam ( , 1887 Azam ( , 1892 , Janet (1887 Janet ( , 1888 Janet ( , 1889 , James(1890), Prince (1908 ), andSidis & Goodhart(1904 . Prince (1908) cited some 24 reported cases. He held that in themore fully developed formsthesecondary or â€˜¿ disintegrated' personality wouldapproximate tothat of normallife and mightpassbefore theworldas mentally healthy.
Hacking (1986) Ross (1987) found an incidence of 4.4% among his patients and claimed that MPD can be readily discovered with a reliable and valid screening instrument (Ross, 1989) .
A basis for evaluation
In the light of the growth in numbers and some of the increasingly improbable stories associated with
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MPD it seemed worthwhile to seek a further method by which to probe the origin of the phenomenon. One of the most explicit discussions is given by Sutciffe & Jones (1962) . They considered various conceptions of multiple personality; as a diagnostic fashion; as a product of shaping in therapy; as a product of hypnotic suggestion; as simulation; and as an extension of characteristics found in â€˜¿ normal' personalities.
We now have a strong diagnostic fashion for the topic in some countries. Hypnotic suggestion accompanies innumerable reports. Simulation is always possible but, if therapists can create the condition by suggestion, the need for simulation is slight. Explanation by an â€˜¿ extension' of normal personalities is disputable since the patterns presented are distinct.
I noticed some examples in which shaping by therapy was the most plausible explanation (Prince, 1908; Janet, 1911) and therefore examined a sample of the literature for information on other diagnoses and on the moments of emergence of secondary personalities. It appeared that the historical context of ideas on the topic might cast light on its growth. This seems the more important because of late the potential for artificial production of the phenomenon has been facilitated by publicity and by DSM-III-R, so that patients appear with foreknowledge of the pattern. This article presents observations on the diagnosis of classic cases and the origins of the extra personalities.
Conceptual presuppositions
Diagnosis in medicine is heuristic and variable (Merskey, 1986). Some diagnoses are preferable to others, because the conditions seem to originate independently of doctors or social demands, or because they are more successful in prognosis or in explaining aetiology, or -most important -because they are the most helpful guides to treatment. They may be influenced by psychological factors or by social expectations, whether we are talking about cancer pain, endogenous depression, or post-traumatic stress disorder. However, it is reasonable to reject those diagnoses whichmostreflect individual choice, conscious role playing, and personal convenience in problem solving, provided we have alternatives which Janet (1887 Janet ( , 1888 Janet ( , 1889 Janet ( , 1907 Janet ( , 1911 Janet ( , 1913 Goddard (1926 Goddard ( ,1927 ; a book by Franz(1933) ;and the discussionby Lewis(1953) . Five quite recent volumesand a paper concerning five individualshavealso been examined (Thigpen&Cleckley, 1957; Horton & Miller, 1972; Schreiber, 1973; Sizemore & Pittillo, 1977; Hawksworth& Schwarz, 1977; Peters & Schwartz, 1978) whichgiveinformation on the emergence of the phenomenon; Allison & Schwarz(1980)described still more cases incompletely.
I reviewedthis material for psychiatricconditions with which MPD might be confused, or which might promote it; and the way in which the second personality emerged.
The discussionof casesoccurringsince 1957is intended to be illustrative and not comprehensive.
Prominent early cases
BenjaminRushmentionedthe earliestknownpossiblecases of MPD (Carlson, 1981) . Ellenberger(1970) statesthat case histories of MPD began to appear in mesmerist writings and later in the medicalliterature only after the disappearance of the phenomena of possession,although exorcismand possessionsometimesstilloccur (Peters & Schwarz, 1978; McKellar, 1979 â€oe¿ In her first state she was quiet and sedate, sober and pensive,almost to melancholy,with an intellectsound though rather slow in its operations, and apparently singularly destitute of the imaginative faculty. In her second state she was gay and cheerful, extravagantly fond of society, of fun, practical jokes, with a lively fancy, and a strong propensity for versification and rhyming... . In her natural state the strange double life which she led was the cause of great unhappiness. She looked upon it as a severe affliction from the hand of Providence, and dreaded a relapse into the opposite state, fearing that she might never recover from it and so might never again in this life know the friendsof her youth, nor her parents, the guardians of her childhood.. . . In the abnormal state, though the prospect of changing into her natural state was far from being pleasant to her, yet it was for different reasons. She looked upon it as passing from a bright and joyous into a dull and stupid phase of life.â€• (1845) is only described briefly but also resembles a bipolar disorder, a dull, quiet phase contrasting with one of extreme excitement.
In Europe most early cases showed only â€˜¿ dual conscious ness'. Authors suchas James (1890)and Janet (1889 Janet ( ,1911 were interested in dissociativephenomena as a means to understanding the operations of the conscious mind.
Independent personalities were of secondary importance
initially. When they were proposed, it was often done overtly.JulesJanet (1888) The symptomcalledhystericalnail (i.e. sharp localised pain in the head) is prominent. One is particularly impressedby her sombremanner and the lack of desire which she has to speak; she responds to questions but that is all (Azam, 1876) Azam describes how then almost every day without any apparent cause or any excitement, she enters her second condition. Suddenly, after a pain in the temples, she fails into a profoundsleepwhichlastsfrom twoto threeminutes. Then she wakes, merry and laughing. She hums a tune as she goes on with the work she is engaged upon, makes jokes with those about her, and does not suffer from the neuralgicpains of her supposedlyordinary state. â€oe¿ In this state, which we call the second condition, Feida has a completeknowledgeof the wholeof her lifeâ€• (Azam, 1892).
â€oe¿ For the last nineor ten yearsthe periodsof the second conditionhavediminishedin timeof duration to lasting a few hours only and appearing only every 25 to 30 days.
So that Felida is almost cured, and will be perfectly so at . . . the menopause.â€• Azam (1892)denied the diagnosis of dual personality, and explained â€˜¿ doubling of consciousness' in terms of somnambulism. The correct diagnosis today might be a rapid-cyclingbipolarstatemodifiedby culturalexpectations.
Pierre Janet described a number of cases, particularly Leonie, Lucie, Rose, Marie, and Marceline. Leonie had beenmuchtreatedpreviouslyby â€˜¿ magnetisers'. Janet (1888, .
Thus it appears that the leading 19th-century cases were examples of bipolar illness (Reynolds, Skae's patient, Felida), organic cerebral disorder (Myers, 1903; Sutcliffe & Jones, 1962) or hypnotic induction. The latter was sometimes overt and frequently persistent, if less obvious.
The turnof the century
The Reverend Ansel Bourne of Rhode Island (James, 1890; Hodgson, 1891) was an itinerant preacher who disappeared from home. Two weeks later a man calling himself A. J. Brown rented a small shop at Norristown, Pennsylvania. Some seven weeks subsequently he woke in a fright and asked where he was. He said that his name wasAnselBourne;he wasentirelyignorant of Norristown.
Under hypnosis he recalled the lost initial two weeks, which included visits to Boston, New York, and Philadelphia, resting, reading, andlooking around. Coons(1984) denies that this was a case of MPD and emphasises the misdiagnosis of many early cases.
This case seems to represent a fugue in which the patient established a new identity. Unlike most MPD cases the persistence of the role was brief and the alternate state was less happy or lively than the usual secondary and tertiary personalities which are described. Stengel (1941) noted the importance of depression in many fugue states.
The ReverendThomas Carson Hanna wasborn in 1872 (Sidis & Goodhart, 1904) .On 15April 1897, he fell from his carriage and was picked up unconscious. Large doses of strychnine were administered hypodermically, and on waking the ReverendHanna appearedto be offering to push one of his physicians. He was strong but was overcomeand bound with straps. He lay quiet and the straps were removed, after which it was recognised that he had lost his speech and appeared to be in a state of â€oe¿ complete mental blindnessâ€•.
He was re-educated, like an infant. In May 1897 the observers remarked, The Reverend Hanna was investigated through dream analysis, interview, and hypnosis. He was encouraged to establish recollections. Incidents from his past life were recalled, or reconstructed (or created). After two months the personalities were reconstituted, apparently spontaneously, in a state resembling mental stupor. No second personality is described, only the recall of primary experiences alternating with the impaired awareness of the external world associated with an amnesia, possibly organic initially, with hysterical elaboration.
The most famous case is that of Christine (Sally) Beauchamp. Prince described her first in 1900, reported her at length in 1905in the first edition of The Dissociation of a Personality, andextendedthedescriptionsubsequently in 1908and 1920.BeforePrince'scase,mostexampleswere patients with episodes of altered consciousness in which information about the world and themselves was merely reduced, or individuals who entered into a second mood state, or condition of activity. Goddard (1926 Goddard ( , 1927 met his patient, Norma-Polly, when she was 19 and an established patient with at least two differentphasesof personality.Good reasonsare given for emotional disturbance in this patient's life but the process of appearance of the second personality is not specified. A strong hint is offered on page 115, were it is suggested that at the age of 18 the patient had the opportunity to visit a sister, aged four, who was being very well cared for, when she was not. She would have been expected to imagine herself in her sister's place. Such legitimate wishes could have developed into the evolution of a personality with another name. However, the proof of this is lacking. Hacking (1991) has obtained evidence that Norma wasadmitted to a psychiatrichospital in 1923 with a diagnosis of mania, although Goddard claimed she had been cured.
The birth of Sally
One of the most interesting cases is briefly described by Cory (1919) . A young woman sitting alone in the house at the piano felt as if something said to her, â€oe¿ take a deep breathâ€•,and the sound of singing which she had never heard before came from the same direction and frightened her. Just before the song she had shuddered and felt as if something had possession of her, she went to the kitchen to get a drink then and asked, mentally, who was it that sang, and she acquiredanother name. It wasseveralweeks however before this other person learned to emerge or to submerge the original personality of the patient. This appears to have been a day-dream or wish for fulfilment of another role partlygrantedby the unconscious. The new person began to speak garbled Spanish, which fitted the needs of that personality. On close inspection this case looks rather like one which might have to be treated as an example of conscious fantasy. It is also not outlined in very much detail.
Misdiagnosis and overt production
The case of Franz (1933) reflects partial misdiagnosis. The patient suffered from a confusional state due to neurosyphiuis and then contracted malaria, which probably halted the syphilis, or slowed it down, but left brain damage. The original physicians did not recognise the diagnosis of neurosyphilis. The patient moved to America and was examined and reported by Franz (1933) simply as a case of MPD. Before the book appeared the patient returned to England, gave evidence of a manic-depressive syndrome, was admitted to the MaudsleyHospital in London in 1931, and was shown to have positive serology for generalparesis of the insane. After treatmentwith inducedmalaria, he still showed some (organic) memory disturbance (Lewis, 1953) . Lewis provides a compelling argument that this patient had some organic brain change and hystericalsymptoms at the time that he was diagnosed as a case of MPD. The conclusion of Sutcliffe& Jones (1962) Cleckley (1957) , also provided her own version of events (Sizemore & Pittillo, 1977) . She was seen for headaches as an out-patient. She seemed to be â€oe¿ neat, colourless, gentle, humble, not under-nourishedâ€•. During one interview she spoke of a voice she heard, apparently wishing to say more and finding herself at a loss for adequate expression. 
Then the hands lightly dropped. She relaxed easily
There was a quick reckless smile. In a bright, unfamiliar voice thatsparkled, thewoman saidâ€˜¿ Hi there
Dcc!'
With a soft and surprisingly intimate syllable of laughter, she crossed her legs, carelesslyswirlingher skirt in a manner which was playful and somehow just a little provocative.â€• Sizemore says that after a discussion of â€˜¿ hearing voices' she changed.
â€oe¿ As she sat. . . eyes downcast, unable to hide her pain, she moaned softly, then slowly the head raised, straight and proud; the sparkling eyes gazed back at him sardonically.
â€˜¿ Hi Doc', she chirped, changing the tired droop of her body to a sensuous slouch with one almost imperceptible wiggle. She asked the doctor for a cigarette, which he gave to her hesitantly. Costner was her maiden name and there were substantial marital difficulties.
Dr Thigpen witnessed a dissociative episode. The important difference between the two accounts is that Eve used her maiden name, a point not evident in The Three Faces of Eve. We can see denial of the marriage, for reasons well described by both doctor and patient. A different pose and set of attitudes were adopted but this might not have been another â€˜¿ personality'; it was an affirmation of a He was punished for bad language, spoken by Johnny.
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In this case serious adult misbehaviour occurred, alternating with phases of sober, calm, settled, and successful work as a law-abiding citizen. The adoption of multiple personalities was conscious and grew out of childhood fantasies with an obvious motive, which are also presented as overtly conscious. There is also another difficulty. Like others in this group, the story is not always told consecutively, like a psychiatric history, but often in the screen-play, flash-back pattern. Christina (Peters & Schwarz, 1978) was terribly abused.
A brutal father killed one of her baby siblings, terrorised her mother, and raped her when she was five. She lost consciousness or recollection, and woke in an orphanage as Marie. She became an alcoholic and a drug addict, fantasised about spirits, and believed she was possessed.
Her doctor claimed to exorcise her. Afterwards he introduced her to the idea of multiple personalities and she developed them. As a child she had retreated into an alternative identity. Her adult condition was taught to her.
W. S. Milligan (Keyes, 1981)committed repeatedrapes. He was found not guilty by reason of insanity, that is MPD, and has been kept in a psychiatric forensic institution. In his first year of life he was in and out of hospital. His alcoholic father committed suicide. A brutal stepfather abused him physically and forced anal intercourse when he was eight or nine years old. From the age of three years and eight months he had an imaginary playmate. At one time he wanted to play with his baby sister, but his mother said he could not do so. When bored, he went to sleep and when he woke he had the identityof â€˜¿ Christene', who could play with the baby. It is not clearif this was an unconscious switch. By the age of nine, he had six other imaginary identities, seemingly often conscious. Every situation called out a new role, for example Adalana, a girl who would enjoy washing dishes when it was required.
Eve and Sybil had depression, severe anorexia, and hysterical amnesias or fugues. The first appearance of a â€˜¿ secondary personality' in Eve was an episode of denial of her marital relationship. We are not informed if she knew of MPD before the change. Once she became a â€˜¿ case' of MPD the stage was set for 22 individual forms to emerge. Thigpen and Cleckley (Thigpen, 1984) have been reluctant to diagnose subsequentcases, but â€˜¿ Eve' has been the model for hundreds more, perhaps for all the cases that followed.
Before the full adult syndrome emerged, Christina had directinstructionfrom her doctorabout multiplepersonality. descriptions and yet a doubt remains. In her case it is uncertain whether there was prior knowledge of the concept of MPD. On the other hand, it does not appear to have beenruled out, there is a strong lead toanother explanation, the childhood experienceis not apparentlytypical, and the more sceptical we become about personality number 22, the more we may question the first alternate. The case of Mulligan also raises doubts but its reliability has already been strongly questioned (Thigpen, 1984) .
In these cases the role of a secondary personality, at any age,developed out of depression or severe emotional conflict, and as a protection from experienceswhich could not otherwise be tolerated. In most or all of them, spontaneous origin of anything that we should call MPD, without some prior awareness of the disorder, is either doubtful or disproven. This need not imply malingeringthat is, the conscious adoption of a symptom in order to achieve a deliberate or unfair benefit, ordinarily at the expenseof others or society. Here the patient, with some awareness, adopts a role which at least part of the environment favours.
Cases 
Discussion
The early cases show limited development of dual consciousness. Their changes are related to fluctuations of mood, anorexia, hypnotism, overtsuggestion, or organic disease. Dual personality as distinct from dual consciousness is sometimes explicitly denied (Azam, 1887) .
James, Azam and Janet were concerned with somnambulism, awareness, automatic behaviour, attention, memory, dissociation, and, ultimately, recognition of the self and awareness of the self. These topics were prominent for Herbert Spencer in his book The Principles of Psychology, in 1855, and aredescribed by Coupland(1892) among others. They continued into the 20th century (e.g. Myers, 1903; Stout, 1919) . The discussion centred on ways to understand the operations of the mind, in quite another direction from the issue of multiple selves. The change which occurred in Eve, as she describes it, is less impressive in a significant particular than the way in which it was described by Thigpen & Cleckley. If she did indeedprincipally deny her married status, choosing her maiden name once MERSKEY I more, and secondarily defended her decision by denying associated items, the creation of the secondary personality was not a complete transformation. The development of the condition in some of the other cases in childhood is a kind of conscious make believe, by necessity, and may be carried through with insight into adult life. Again, this does not amount to spontaneous, functioning alternate personalities who should be granted a life of their own for pragmatic, legal, or therapeutic purposes.
A relevant human mechanism appears in patients with paralysed limbs, or dysfunction of a part. A patient with hemi-ballismus, unable to control the erratic and violent movements of her left arm, described it separately as â€˜¿ George'. The tendency to distance oneself from an unpleasant phenomenon is common and easy to adopt. MPD offers a mode of separating, splitting, and isolating particular subjective problems. However, the evidence so far implies that it requires assistance.
Proponents of the diagnosis of MPD point to the high frequency of sexual abuse in the histories of sufferers. In Canada, Ross et a ! (1990) found that 90% of 102 patients were so affected, while a national survey (Committee on Sexual Offences Against Children and Youth, 1984) indicated some sexual abuse by touching or attempted assault in 45.6% of females. This includes incidents of exposure or threatened abuse. Sexual abuse in childhood is not specific to a particular diagnosis. Walker et a! (1988) reported that 64% of patients with chronic pelvic pain had a history of sexual abuse, whereas 23Â°lo of a control group had comparable experiences; many patients with pelvic pain also had symptoms of a type associated with depressive and somatic complaints. The frequency of childhood deprivation and other abuse in current patients with symptoms related to hysteria has been recognised for some time in discussions of hospital addiction and simulated illness (Merskey, 1979, p. 66) . As investigators have tended to emphasise sexual abuse as a criterion for the diagnosis of MPD, it is hardly surprising that the phenomenon has increased in their sample, but the definition of the diagnosis in terms of sexual abuse cannot serve as a proof of the independent existence of the condition.
More recently, larger series of cases have been published and the journal Dissociation (no.2, vol.2, June 1989) has dealt specifically with the question of iatrogenesis. Several arguments are offered to deny the occurrence, or importance, of iatrogenesis. Among them, Ross eta! (1989) claim that iatrogenic production of MPD by specialists in dissociation has not been reported in the literature. The analysis here of the most prominent cases shows otherwise. The same authors also suggest that because they have found no important demographic differences between the MPD patients of psychiatrists with many cases and psychiatrists with few cases, this means that those with many cases are not producing them differentially. This argument is not a proof of validity, only consistency of selection. Likewise, reliability of diagnosis (Ross, 1989) is not proof of validity. Kluft (1989) mentions the worsening of MPD by â€˜¿ inept' therapy. Yet the authors of the relevant section of DSMâ€"IIIâ€"R allow up to 100 alternate personalities in a case, and Kluft (1982) has himself reported 19 patients with 11â€"30 personalities and 2 with more than 30 personalities.
Recent cases are not appropriate subject matter to explore the question of suggestion, since they have all been open to it in developed countries. Some cases recently reported from India also indicate the influence of the cinema in producing rather facile fugue states (Adityanjee ci a!, 1989 ). Instead, we should require that early cases, and any late cases that might be thought to have escaped the pervasive influence of the media, or iatrogenesis, should show spontaneous origin without any reasonable doubt. The more recent cases of note indicate the common, rather journalistic patterns of the supposed disorder.
It is always open of course to any particular investigator to say, â€oe¿ My patient had no training, arose naturally, and was not prepared by meâ€•.
Fortunately, or otherwise, that position has been
undermined by widespread knowledge of the concept.
If the case were to be proved, it should have been done with Eve at the latest, and it was not. The concept of MPD should be seen now as, at best, a by-way in the history of ideas.
Ill-effects of the diagnosis
Many of the patients have had awful experiences with an extensive history of child abuse, which needs 
